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The Ordinary and the Experimental: 
Cook Wilson and Austin on Method in 
Philosophy 
 
Guy Longworth1 
October 30th 2017 
 
To what extent was ordinary language philosophy a precursor to 
experimental philosophy? Since the conditions on pursuit of either 
project are at best unclear, and at worst protean, the general 
question is hard to address. I focus instead on particular cases, 
seeking to uncover some central aspects of J. L. Austin’s and John 
Cook Wilson’s ordinary language based approach to philosophical 
method. I make a start at addressing three questions. First, what 
distinguishes their approach from other more traditional 
approaches? Second, is their approach a form of experimental 
philosophy? Third, given their aims, should it have been? I offer 
the following preliminary answers. First, their approach 
distinctively emphasizes attention to what we should say when. 
Second, their approach is closer to contemporary experimental 
mathematics than it is to some prominent forms of contemporary 
experimental philosophy. Third, some purported grounds for 
pursuing their aims by way of surveying what individual speakers 
would say when are not compelling. 
 
 
...one who wants to achieve knowledge above the 
ordinary level should feel ashamed at having taken 
ordinary ways of talking as a basis for doubt. 
—Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy  
 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
J. L. Austin is a paradigm case of an ordinary language philosopher. That 
isn’t yet to say very much, either about Austin or about ordinary 
language philosophy. As Austin stressed, co-classification often masks 
significant difference: 
 																																																								
1 I’m grateful to Michael Beaney, Stephen Butterfill, John Collins, Thomas 
Crowther, Naomi Eilan, Eugen Fischer, Nat Hansen, Mark Kalderon, Joshua 
Knobe, Hemdat Lerman, Rory Madden, Mike Martin, Josephine Salverda, 
Matthew Soteriou, Charles Travis, David Wiggins, and three anonymous 
reviewers. 
	 2 
I am not denying that cases…could be lumped together under some 
single name. A single name might in itself be innocent enough, 
provided its use was not taken to imply either (a) that the cases 
were all alike, or (b) that they were all in certain ways alike. What 
matters is that the facts should not be pre-judged and (therefore) 
neglected. (1962a: 14, fn.1) 
 
Austin’s emphasis on the importance of attending to distinctions is pre-
eminent amongst the ideas that he inherited from John Cook Wilson. 
Other threads in their shared conceptions of method will be unraveled 
below. A major task will be to say what, if anything, marks their 
methods off from others. 
My aim in discussing the two thinkers’ conceptions of method is 
partly historical. A further hope is that such a discussion might enhance 
our understanding of the extent to which their methods were, or should 
have been, experimental. To foreshadow, experimental methods are 
sufficiently motley to allow for their intersection with the methods of 
Austin and Cook Wilson, but the members of that intersection are 
more akin to cases of experimental mathematics than to cases of 
contemporary experimental philosophy. Cook Wilson and Austin aimed 
to exploit attention to ordinary language with the end of uncovering 
optimal ways of characterising the facts: tracts of (typically, and 
approximately) extra-linguistic and extra-conceptual reality. By contrast, 
the end of much recent work in experimental philosophy has been 
limited to exploring extant conceptions of that reality. 
§2 considers some of what Cook Wilson and Austin had to say 
about their methods and seeks to discern ways in which their methods 
were novel. One seemingly novel idea is that we might seek to address 
philosophical questions via attention to “what we should say when” 
(Austin 1956–7: 182). §3 begins to unpack that idea and to consider some 
skeptical reactions. §4 pursues such reactions further by discussing the 
extent to which Austin’s methods involved, or should have involved, 
experiment—that is, “twisting the lion’s tail,” in Thomas Kuhn’s 
memorable misattribution to Bacon. (Kuhn 1976: 12) (My discussion will 
be highly selective. For further discussion of Cook Wilson’s and Austin’s 
methods, see Birken-Bertsch 2014; Hacker 2013; Hanfling 2000: 26–37; 
Longworth 2012; Lyas ed. 1971; Marion 2000a, 2000b; Travis and 
Kalderon 2013; Urmson 1967, 1969; Warnock 1989: 1–10.) 
 
 
2. What the Philosophers Say. 
Let’s begin by considering some of Austin’s ‘cackle’ (1956–7: 189)—that 
is, some of what he has to say about his methods. We’ll join Austin in 
focusing on the idea of proceeding from an examination of “what we 
should say when, and so why and what we should mean by it.” (1956–7: 181) 
Austin offers three main lines of justification for this way of proceeding: 
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First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean 
tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we 
must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us. 
Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or 
things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold 
them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their 
inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world 
without blinkers. Thirdly, and more hopefully, our common stock 
of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth 
drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in 
the lifetime of many generations: these surely are likely to be more 
numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test 
of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all 
ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I 
are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon—the most 
favoured alternative method. (1956–7: 181–182) 
 
Each of Austin’s lines of justification presupposes a distinction between 
subject-matters: on one hand, words; and, on the other, (other) facts or 
things. Words are tools with which we attempt to, amongst other 
things, characterize facts or things. Those attempts can misfire, either 
(first) because we lack a clear understanding of how specific tools should 
be used, or (secondly) because selected tools aren’t fit for the specific 
task at hand. However, (thirdly) there are grounds for optimism that a 
natural language will contain a sufficient array of tools to deal adequately 
with at least those distinctions and connexions amongst facts and things 
that it has been important, for ordinary or practical purposes, to mark. 
(Austin sometimes preferred to characterize words as instruments, 
noting our natural reaction to a surgeon’s saying, “Right, I’ll just go and 
get my tools.” (Warnock 1973: 38–39; Pitcher 1973: 24)) 
Austin’s third line of justification tracks very closely an earlier 
comment of Cook Wilson’s: 
 
The authority of language is too often forgotten in philosophy, 
with serious results. Distinctions made or applied in ordinary 
language are more likely to be right than wrong. Developed, as 
they have been, in what may be called the natural course of 
thinking, under the influence of experience and in the 
apprehension of particular truths, whether of everyday life or of 
science, they are not due to any preconceived theory. On the other 
hand, the actual fact is that a philosophical distinction is prima 
facie more likely to be wrong than what is called a popular 
distinction, because it is based on a philosophic theory which may 
be wrong in its ultimate principles. This is so far from being 
appreciated that the reverse opinion is held and there is a tendency 
to regard the linguistic distinction as the less trustworthy because 
it is popular and not due to reflective thought. The truth is the 
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other way. Reflective thought tends to be too abstract, while the 
experience which has developed the popular distinctions recorded 
in language is always in contact with the particular facts. (Cook 
Wilson 1926: 874–875) 
 
Cook Wilson and Austin both claim that distinctions made in ordinary 
language are more likely to be right (worthwhile) than wrong (pointless), 
and more likely to be right than are distinctions drawn by philosophers 
without due attention to the functioning of ordinary language. However, 
it’s not immediately clear at which alternative practices they are tilting. 
Suppose, for example, that one hoped to attain philosophical 
understanding of what it is for someone to know something. One very 
natural way of proceeding would go via attention to the distinction, or 
distinctions, between cases in which instances of “x knows y” are 
correctly applicable and cases in which they aren’t. Furthermore, given 
that one hopes to attain understanding of what it is for someone to 
know something, it’s not clear how attention to any other distinction, or 
distinctions, could be more illuminating. In that case, it would seem that 
opposition to Cook Wilson’s and Austin’s claim would have to amount 
to objection to the hope of attaining understanding of what it is for 
someone to know something, perhaps due to skepticism about the 
rightness or worth of the purported distinction(s) between cases in 
which someone knows something and others. 
More delicately, someone might preserve the hope of coming to 
understand knowing, and proceed with that end, but fail adequately to 
track the distinction between cases in which instances of “x knows y” 
are applicable and others. That might happen, for example, because, 
although their theorizing took off from attention to cases on either side 
of the target distinction, it was then driven by attention to salient, or 
especially simple, projections from those initial cases, rather than by 
attention to way their competence with the expression “x knows y” in 
fact guides its applications to particular cases. In that way, they might in 
effect develop an armchair-constructed distinction, rather than tracing a 
distinction developed in the natural course of experience.  
There is room for dispute over the comparative standing of 
ordinary and artificial distinctions. However, I expect that many 
contemporary theorists will find reasonable the aim of seeking 
understanding of, e.g., knowing. And they are likely also to find 
reasonable the idea that tracking the distinction between cases in which 
“x knows y” is applicable and other cases is one way of tracking the 
distinction between cases in which x knows y and other cases. After all, 
that has been a central approach since Plato. (See e.g. Hanfling 2000: 
15–25.) At this point, then, we face two connected questions. First, given 
that the core of Austin’s and Cook Wilson’s proposal seems broadly to 
fit the canon, is there anything distinctive about their methods? 
Secondly, given that their core proposal specifies ends, rather than 
means, how should we go about pursuing those ends? 
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Austin makes a start at addressing the two questions in the 
following passage: 
 
In view of the prevalence of the slogan ‘ordinary language’, and of 
such names as ‘linguistic’ or ‘analytic’ philosophy or ‘the analysis of 
language’, one thing needs specially emphasizing to counter 
misunderstandings. When we examine what we should say when, 
what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again 
not merely at words (or ‘meanings’, whatever they may be) but also 
at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a 
sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, 
though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena. For this reason 
I think it might be better to use, for this way of doing philosophy, 
some less misleading name than those given above—for instance, 
‘linguistic phenomenology’, only that is rather a mouthful. (Austin 
1956–7: 182) 
 
The passage contains two central ideas. The first is that an examination 
of “what we should say when, what words we should use in what 
situations” might be a means to the end of uncovering the ranges of 
conditions in which the target expressions are, or aren’t, applicable. 
Although that doesn’t clearly mark out a distinctive approach, it hints at 
one. The second idea is that attention to what we should say when isn’t 
merely, or simply, attention to words; it is also, and at the same time, 
attention to the phenomena which words are used to characterize. 
Again, Cook Wilson got there first, and with greater articulation. 
The base proposal is that we should pursue questions about, say, 
knowing, via reflection on ordinary talk about knowing. Two traditional 
concerns about this approach are, first, that, since it relies on our 
standing knowledge of how words should be used, it is mysterious how it 
could facilitate discovery and, secondly, that in pursuing this approach, 
we should be forced to accept as authoritative every naïve application of 
a word: 
 
It seems…that we can only take as data the actual application of 
the names: if so, we are at the mercy of usage. We cannot criticize 
it: even if we found in it anything apparently contradictory we 
should be helpless to decide. Again, what security have we that we 
make the right generalisation and find out what people really 
mean? Would it not be the safest way, as it is also the easiest, to 
ask people who use the word what they mean?” (Cook Wilson 1926: 
41) 
 
Cook Wilson rejects the idea that ordinary speakers are 
straightforwardly authoritative about the principle governing the 
application of words with whose use they are competent: 
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Not uncommonly those who apply a principle rightly in particular 
cases are unable to give a correct account of its general character. 
(Cook Wilson 1926: 82–83) 
 
His explanation of how we can nonetheless exploit our competence in 
order to uncover our principle is worth quoting at length: 
 
Obviously we must start from the facts of the use of a name, and 
shall be guided at first certainly by the name: and so far we may 
appear to be examining the meaning of a name. Next we have to 
think about the individual instances, to see what they have in 
common, what it is in fact that actuated us. This seems by contrast 
to be the examination of a thing or reality as opposed to a name. 
At this stage we must take first what seems to us common in 
certain definite cases before us: next test what we have got by 
considering other instances of our own application of the name, 
other instances (more accurately) in which the principle has been 
working in us. Observe that in every such step we rely upon the 
rightness of our use of the principle in particular cases; this does 
not mean that we are sure of ourselves in every case, but that there 
are cases at all events about which we are sure. This explains what 
in the Socratic attempt to find definitions would otherwise be 
paradoxical and inexplicable. There is a further stage when we 
have, or think we have, discovered the nature of the principle 
which has really actuated us. We may now correct some of our 
applications of the name because we see that some instances do 
not really possess the quality which corresponds to what we now 
understand the principle to be. This explains how it should be 
possible to criticize the facts out of which we have been drawing 
our data.” (Cook Wilson 1926: 44–45) 
 
Cook Wilson’s proposal is that we should begin with secure individual 
applications to cases of a target expression. We should then try to 
discern the features of those cases which actuated our applications. We 
can then refine, and develop, our view about those actuating features by 
testing them against our secure willingness (/unwillingness) to apply the 
target expression in cases exhibiting (/failing to exhibit) those features. 
In that way, our security with respect to a core range of applications can 
transmit to security with respect to our view of actuating features in 
order to support a view about the core principle, or principles, guiding 
our naïve applications. And our thus supported view about the core 
principles can then be used to support, or correct, applications about 
which we were initially less sure. In effect, our secure applications of an 
expression help to make available data for the construction of a theory 
about the principle governing our overall competence with the use of 
the expression. (We shouldn’t seek too sharp a distinction between that 
model and one on which exposure to, and reflection on, secure 
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applications is at the service of something closer to training than to 
theory construction.) In that way, we can exploit our competence with 
the use of the target expression in order to make discoveries about the 
principle governing that use, and so to sharpen both our competence 
and our conception of the subject-matter marked out by that use. (It is 
worth comparing the discussion of Plato’s engagement with this issue in 
Nehamas 1986. At this level of generality, we can leave open how 
precisely applications are to be understood—whether, for example, they 
must serve descriptive functions. We can also leave open the precise 
delimitation of cases—whether they should be individuated only by 
appeal to the focal subject matters of invited judgments or also, for 
example, by appeal to the intents and purposes of those being invited to 
judge.) 
We are now in a better position to understand Austin’s promotion 
of adherence to the distinctions marked out by our common stock of 
words, and its connection with his recognition of the sometime 
arbitrariness and inadequacy of those distinctions. Consider the second 
stage of Cook Wilson’s procedure. At that stage, having selected a range 
of cases with respect to which our applications of a term are especially 
secure, we seek to discern the features of those cases which actuated 
those secure applications. At that stage, we are liable to attend to the 
most salient features of the cases, and to project in what we take to be 
the most natural or straightforward ways from those features. In that 
way, we are liable to attend to the phenomena rather than to the 
operation of our competence with the target expression. If the 
operation of our competence tracked the most salient features of cases, 
in the most straightforward ways, then that approach might safely 
converge on the principle governing our use. However, we can only 
acquire evidence of convergence by checking our initial view of the 
principle against novel applications of the target expression. And when 
we do that, we find that the pattern of those novel applications 
sometimes appears arbitrary relative to the most natural seeming 
projection from salient features of our initial cases. Thus, Austin and 
Cook Wilson can be seen as distinctively promoting single-minded 
attention to the actual pattern in our applications of an expression over 
what might seem to be more natural projections from the subject 
matters of a proper subset of those applications. Their prioritizing of 
the actual pattern of use over the seemingly natural pattern is in turn 
justified by the fact that it is the actual pattern, as opposed to the 
seemingly natural, which has withstood the test of time. (See also 
Prichard 1912 and Williams 1988.) 
It is important not to overplay the distinction between application 
and projection. For even naïve applications of an expression can involve 
judgement or discernment, with respect both to the phenomena and to 
their fit with our principle. And those exercises of judgement or 
discernment may be conditioned by natural projections from features of 
other cases in which the expression has been applied. Austin sketched 
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the suggested interplay between application and projection in the 
following way: 
 
…[E]ssential though it is as a preliminary to track down the detail 
of our ordinary use of words, it seems that we shall in the end 
always be compelled to straighten them out to some extent…. [I]t 
seems hardly deniable that in…thought and language we do, for 
better or worse and whether consciously or unconsciously, make 
use of…models (not, of course, necessarily only one such). (Austin 
1952–3: 134) 
 
Though cases in which we shall have to call, describe, &c., instead 
of, in black-and-white terms, identifying, stating, &c.[—that is, 
cases in which “there occur in the world to be talked about items 
of types which do not exactly match any of the patterns in our 
stock (the sense of any of our names)”—], are sure to arise 
continually, we feel ourselves sometimes bound to cope with them 
as they arise by means of fresh linguistic legislation. In calling 
there is indeed already implicit an element of legislation by 
precedent. (Austin 1952–3: 149; interposition: 146) 
  
Crudely, the correspondence between applicability conditions and 
environmental distinctions—for example, between the question whether 
“x knows y” is correctly applicable in a particular case and the question 
whether, in that case, x knows y—means that there is no principled 
distinction between finding out about applicability conditions and 
finding out about the world. David Wiggins presents a closely related 
thought in the following way: 
 
Not only does the real definition depend on real specimens. The 
question of its application and correctness or incorrectness also 
depends crucially on the facts about these specimens. All the same, 
real definitions lie within the province of semantics, as well as of 
empirical fact. No lifelike elucidation of ordinary discourse could 
be contrived without them. [Footnote suppressed.] Let us forget 
once and for all the very idea of some knowledge of language or 
meaning that is not knowledge of the world itself. (Wiggins 2001: 
12. The suppressed footnote cites Austin 1952–3 as a precursor. See 
also Wiggins 2001: 77–106. Austin’s work on Leibniz may have 
figured in opening his eyes to the role of specimens in the 
determination of applicability conditions.) 
 
So much, then, for the interplay between attention to applications and 
attention to their phenomenal targets, and for Austin’s and Cook 
Wilson’s distinctive emphasis on the former. Still, one might wonder 
about the extent to which their methods are novel. If there is novelty 
here, it is plausibly to be found in Austin’s proposal about the initial 
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source of data for theorizing about applicability conditions—that is, his 
idea that we might gain purchase on the applications of an expression 
through attention to “what we should say when, what words we should 
use in what situations.” (Austin 1956–7: 182) What, precisely, does 
Austin’s proposal amount to? 
 
 
3. What We Should Say When. 
Our question about Austin’s proposal can be resolved into three sub-
questions. First, how should we understand his appeal to what we should 
say when? Is this a matter merely of our uses of words in circumstances; 
our presentation of words as correctly applicable or inapplicable in those 
circumstances; what should (or shouldn’t) be said in those 
circumstances; or something else? Second, how can we make the 
transition from claims about what we should say when, when 
understood in Austin’s way, to claims about the correct applicability of 
target expressions? Is a claim about what should be said when simply a 
claim about correct applicability; or is it rather a claim about data for 
what are then further theoretical claims about correct applicability? 
(We’ve already seen reasons to think that secure claims about what we 
should say in some particular cases might serve as the basis for more 
tentative, theoretical claims about what we should say in cases with 
respect to which our views are less secure.) Third, what, if anything, 
grounds our knowledge, or entitles us to our opinion, about what we 
should say when? Is this empirical knowledge, say, about what each of 
us, or others, would say when, or is it something else? 
Charles Travis and Mark Kalderon take a firm stand on our first 
and second sub-questions: 
 
Austin’s vocabulary here, specifically, ‘what we should say when’, 
can be misread. Supposing that there are things words are for 
saying, it would be natural to read this as: ‘If you (one) were to use 
these words of this, or in these circumstances, what would you say?’ 
What one thus asks after is how words in fact work. Austin clearly 
hears things this way. Grice insists on a different reading. On it, 
‘what we would say’ merely reports our customs, mores, manners: 
‘One wouldn’t say, “What’s the vigorish?” when the neighbor asks 
to borrow a cup of milk’, ‘One shouldn’t say, “That’s just 
autobiography” to your small niece when she says she wants 
another biscuit’. But asking what one would say when can be a way 
of asking what the words one uses in fact apply to, or describe 
truly—what they are for in their language. (Travis and Kalderon 
2013: 498)  
 
Their view is that Austin’s talk about what we should say when is, in 
effect, already talk about the correct applicability of expressions. That 
straightforward answer to the first and second sub-questions might 
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naturally seem to provoke a pointed version of the third: how do you 
(/does one) know what you (/one) should say when—that is, whether a 
given expression is correctly applicable here? Alternatively, the answer 
to the first sub-question which Travis and Kalderon attribute to Grice—
on which what we should say when is a matter of our willingness, or 
unwillingness, to utter certain words in specific circumstances, or 
whether those words seem to us to be applicable here—might seem to 
make it comparatively easy to address the third sub-question. But we 
would then face difficulties in answering the second question. For, as 
Grice and others have stressed, the gap between, on one side, claims 
about our willingness or unwillingness to utter certain words in specific 
circumstances, or our opinions about whether those words seem to 
apply or not, and, on the other side, claims about correct applicability, 
can be traversed only on the basis of substantive theory, and then only 
tentatively. (See also White 1967; Travis 1985.) 
Some of what Austin wrote might seem to suggest that he would 
have been willing to sacrifice reach for security. Thus, for example, he 
considers “a good site for field work in philosophy” an area “where 
ordinary language is rich and subtle”, and “which is not too much 
trodden into bogs or tracks by traditional philosophy”: 
 
Here at last we should be able to unfreeze, to loosen up and get 
going on agreeing about discoveries, however small, and on 
agreeing about how to reach agreement. (Austin 1956–7: 182–3) 
 
Austin’s emphasis on the possibility of reaching agreement might seem 
to suggest the idea of an especially secure basis for further theorizing, a 
sort of linguistic given. The emphasis recurs in subtly different form 
here: 
 
We must…imagine some cases (imagine them carefully and in 
detail and comprehensively) and try to reach agreement upon what 
we should in fact say concerning them. If we can reach this 
agreement, we shall have some data (‘experimental’ data, in fact) 
which we can then go on to explain. Here, the explanation will be 
an account of the meanings of these expressions… (Austin 1966: 
274) 
 
Here, Austin suggests that we have data only where we have reached 
agreement. And that might be taken, in turn, to suggest that our data 
must be especially secure. We might, for example, take disagreement to 
entail error on behalf of at least one party. (At a minimum, this would 
require the obtaining of genuine disagreement, as opposed to mere 
difference. See Austin 1956–7: 183–185.) Thus, the possibility of 
disagreement would entail the possibility of error. And we might, in 
turn, hold that we can obtain knowledge only where there is no 
possibility of error. Thus, if non-theoretical claims about correct 
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applicability are possible sites of disagreement, in a way that claims 
about willingness or unwillingness to utter are not, then that might seem 
to make pressing the pointed question, how can one know whether a 
given expression is correctly applicable here? 
Pulling in the opposing direction is that Austin was well aware that 
it doesn’t follow from the fact that an ability is fallible that it cannot be 
exercised successfully. Suppose, then, that competence with a linguistic 
expression comprises an ability to know whether it is correctly 
applicable with respect to presented cases. On that supposition, 
successful exercises of the competence results in knowledge of whether 
the expression is correctly applicable. Such an ability is bound to be 
fallible: there will be cases in which its exercise is unsuccessful and, so, 
in which that exercise does not result in knowledge, and may even result 
in false opinion. But the fact that the ability to knowledgably apply an 
expression is fallible doesn’t entail that it cannot be exercised 
successfully and, in that case, result in knowledge of correct application. 
Indeed, that an ability to know can be fallible is one of the central take-
home messages of Austin’s 1946 and 1962a. Thus, it needn’t follow from 
the fact that there can be disagreement—or, more generally, error—
about whether an expression is correctly applicable that competence 
with the expression isn’t a capacity whose successful exercise results in 
knowledge of whether it is correctly applicable.  
Austin’s emphasis on seeking out good sites for field work, and 
Cook Wilson’s emphasis on starting with especially secure cases, both 
manifest recognition that knowledge delivering capacities can be fallible. 
Two special sources of fallibility stressed by Austin are prejudice and 
what he called “looseness”, where the latter seems to cover not only 
inattention to available distinctions, but also inadequate training: 
 
It is likely enough that our ordinary use of the terms is fairly loose, 
that we do not always distinguish carefully between them, although 
there is a distinction which can be marked by their means. 
Contrast, for example, the following: 
 
(1) You call that crimson? But surely no crimson can have so much 
blue in it? That is not what crimson is at all. 
You describe it as crimson? But look, it has lots of blue in it. It 
is not really like crimson at all…. 
 
If many such examples are studied, the watershed between calling 
and describing appears to take shape. (Austin 1952–3: 148–149; 
1956–7: 182–185) 
 
Furthermore, there are other natural explanations for Austin’s emphasis 
on agreement. For one thing, although disagreement needn’t support 
the view that neither party knows, agreement can support the view that 
both parties do. For another, both Austin and Cook Wilson hope to 
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begin with an especially secure range of applications, and it would be 
reasonable to think that agreement is a mark of security. For a third, the 
nature of the target facts might make agreement especially important. 
Facts about the correct application of an expression plausibly depend, in 
part, on facts about the plurality of competent users of that expression. 
In that case, it would seem reasonable to prioritize those views about 
correct applicability which we can bring others to share. (For an 
excellent discussion of related issues about reach and security, see 
Williamson 2004, especially 109–131.) 
 
 
4. Twisting the Lion’s Tail. 
We saw in the previous section that Austin was prepared to characterize 
some of competent speakers’ shared views about whether an application 
is correct as ‘experimental’ data (his quotation marks). What did he 
mean? And was he right? 
The expression “experiment” began to diverge in meaning from 
“experience” only in the 17th Century. (Dear 2006: 106; Hinton 1973a: 5–
8; Wootton 2015: 310–360) However, although typical experiments 
involve interventions with observable results, observation seems to be 
inessential to contemporary usage, as recorded in the OED. Instead, we 
find an emphasis on active intervention: “The action of trying anything, 
or putting it to proof”; “A tentative procedure”; “An action or operation 
undertaken in order to discover something unknown, to test a 
hypothesis, or establish or illustrate some known truth.” (See also Field 
and Hole 2003; Sorensen 1992: 186–251; Tiles 1993.) So, despite the drag 
induced by etymology and stereotypes, there is no immediate reason to 
think that Austin’s ‘experimental’ data must be got via observation. 
Alternatively, we’ve already seen a way in which Austin’s method 
involves active intervention: we are to intervene on subjects (often, 
ourselves) by presenting them with various cases, together with 
questions about what they should say about those cases. Furthermore, 
we’ve seen one way in which the procedure is tentative: secure 
judgement, or knowledge, about the specific characterisation of 
particular cases, is used in order to develop and test less secure general 
hypotheses concerning the range of cases with respect to which target 
expressions are applicable. 
As we saw in the previous section, an alternative view would locate 
tentativeness—the space between experimental results and 
hypotheses—at a different point. According to the alternative, 
experimental interventions on competent speakers deliver only data 
about competent speakers’ opinions about the correctness of particular 
applications. That information may then be used to develop and test 
distinct hypotheses even about the correctness of particular 
applications. As we’ve seen, an attempt to motivate such a view might 
be made on the basis of reflection on individual fallibility. Connectedly, 
it might be motivated by the idea that facts about correct application 
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are facts about what we should say, together with skeptical concerns 
about individual speakers’ authority to judge about what other 
competent speakers would say. 
We can gain some purchase on Austin’s attitude towards the 
alternative view by considering his reaction to its implementation in the 
work of Arne Naess. Naess pursued what he called ‘experimental 
semantics’ by surveying speakers’ judgements about cases, as well as 
their more general views about target expressions. (For more detailed 
discussion of, and references to, Naess’s work, see e.g. Chapman 2011 
and ms; Murphy 2014.) His work was therefore similar in some respects 
to some prominent strains of contemporary experimental philosophy. 
(See e.g. Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich 2001; Hansen 2014; Hansen and 
Chemla 2015.) Although the evidence we have about Austin’s attitude to 
this project is fragmentary, the fragments cast a shadow. First, we have 
the following reports from Geoffrey Warnock: 
 
I remember that [Austin] once came back from America—I think 
in 1956—a good deal perturbed by what he thought to be the 
increasing prestige there of Arne Naess. This must have been 
because he thought he saw the right purpose—a more empirical, 
‘objective’ way of doing philosophy, offering the hope of getting 
things actually settled by patient industry—in danger of being 
compromised by what he took to be radically wrong methods. ‘It’s 
infiltrating from the West’, he said, shaking his head. (Warnock 
1973: 43) 
 
In discussion with Arne Naess at Berkeley in 1958, Austin appears 
to have spoken as if he still regarded some kind of systematic co-
operation in philosophy as not only desirable, but also practicable. 
However, the record of this discussion is neither perfectly clear 
nor certainly reliable. (It goes without saying that Austin was 
careful to distinguish the programme he had in mind from the 
kind of Gallup-poll, empirical team-work which Naess believed in, 
and which Austin regarded as, in principle, misguided. (Warnock 
1963: 14, fn.2) 
 
As Warnock mentions, some records remain of Austin’s discussions 
with Naess. They seem to indicate that Austin was not open to having 
his views about what we should say when overruled by other speakers’ 
unreflective opinions: 
 
AUSTIN: The subjects gave wrong answers concerning their own 
use of expressions, e.g.: when saying they would never use “he 
yawned voluntarily” as a description of a perfectly ordinary event 
of yawning because it is perfectly obvious that such yawnings are 
voluntary. Actually the subjects would not say it because it cannot be said. 
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NAESS: The subjects interpreted “he yawned voluntarily” as 
synonymous with “he was not forced to yawn” and thus conceived 
it as obvious that he was not forced to (and therefore not worth 
while saying). 
AUSTIN: But then they do not know well enough the expression 
“voluntary.” It is too difficult a word, maybe. Better use “clumsy.” 
(Austin and Naess 1964, as reported in Murphy 2014: 354.)  
 
Austin clearly felt that his competence with “voluntary”, as honed by 
reflective training, put him in a position to correct naïve opinion. 
Furthermore, although he appears willing to make predictions about 
other people’s usage, they are based on what he takes to be facts about 
the target expression (‘“he yawned voluntarily” cannot be said’), and are 
conditional on the predicted usage’s issuing from competence. 
Disagreement with the secure judgment of the competent is evidence of 
incompetence. 
Austin’s model of experimental philosophy involves the assembly 
of particular pieces of knowledge to the effect than a target expression 
is, or isn’t applicable, in particular cases. Such knowledge is knowledge 
about an expression—say, about the expression “voluntary”—and, at the 
same time, knowledge about the world—say, about whether some 
particular activity is, or could have been, voluntary. Those pieces of 
knowledge are at the service of developing and testing hypotheses about 
the principle, or principles, governing application of the target 
expression. (Alternatively, or simultaneously, they are at the service of 
honing one’s competence.) Those principles, in turn, concern both the 
target expression and the environmental distinctions and connections 
which fully competent use of the expression would track. 
We might usefully compare our two models of experimental 
ordinary language philosophy with two models of how experimental 
methods might be applied to mathematical practice. The first model is 
embodied in an extant mathematical practice, experimental 
mathematics. To a good first approximation, the practice involves the 
assembly of a large number of particular instances of a conjectured 
generalization—say, an equation—as a guide to the development of 
methods of proof or disproof of the target conjecture. Alan Baker offers 
the following nice example: 
 
A real number is said to be normal in base n if every sequence of 
digits (of any given length) occurs equally often in its base-n 
expansion. A number is absolutely normal if it is normal in every 
base. Consider the following hypothesis: 
 
Conjecture Every non-rational algebraic number is absolutely 
normal. 
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Borwein and Bailey used a computer to compute to 10,000 
decimal digits the square roots and cube roots of the positive 
integers smaller than 1,000, and then they subjected these data to 
certain statistical tests. (Baker 2008: 333, reporting work in 
Borwein and Bailey 2004.) 
 
As with Austin’s model of experimental philosophy, the practice 
depends on the accuracy of the assembled instances. And like Austin’s 
model, those instances are used to ground conjectures about the overall 
pattern of instances which may then be put to further test. (Further test 
may involve checking the conjecture against further instances, or—more 
commonly in mathematics than in philosophy—the construction of 
proof.) (See e.g. Baker 2008.) 
The second model is more likely to be found in psychology than in 
mathematics. Operating in accord with this model involves the assembly 
of a large number of people’s opinions about the outcome of particular 
calculations of values of a mathematical generalization. In general, there 
is unlikely to be a perfect correlation between people’s opinions about 
the outcome of a calculation and the actual outcome, so it would be 
unreasonable to expect the data delivered by this procedure to figure 
centrally in the mathematical exploration of the target generalization. 
Rather, it would be unreasonable to expect such data to be revealing 
about anything other than the patterns of individual or group 
competence and incompetence, and perhaps about the development and 
structure of individual mathematical abilities. (Such results might figure 
peripherally in the development of mathematical practice—for example, 
by helping to shape optimal presentation of proofs, or pedagogical 
practice.) In some cases, for example in work on the Wason Selection 
Task, attention is also paid to subjects’ reflective corrections of their 
initial responses, and those might sometimes be a better guide not only 
to the outputs of subjects’ competence, but also the mathematical facts 
that they aim to track. (See e.g. Wason 1968.) However, the core aim of 
such work is to delimit subjects’ abilities (the mathematical facts in 
question are often trivial), and there is no guarantee that subjects’ most 
reflective judgments will reflect their core competences. (A relevant case 
study is provided in linguistics by the way that so-called prestige 
accretions can distort judgment, leading, for example, to the over-
application of case marking, as when “who” becomes “whom”. See e.g. 
Lasnik and Sobin 2000.)  
It seems clear that Austin’s conception of experimental ordinary 
language philosophy is closer to the first model—experimental 
mathematics proper—than it is to the second. The aim, in both ordinary 
language philosophy and experimental mathematics, is to exploit 
competence in order to develop understanding of the domain of facts 
that competence works. In both cases, exploitation goes via secure 
individual deliverances of competence—pieces of knowledge about 
particular applications of expressions in particular cases and individual 
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calculative results, respectively. (In the case of experimental 
mathematics, the competence in question is typically embodied, 
vicariously, in computers.) In both cases, those individual deliverances 
are used in order to gain purchase on cases with respect to which 
individual competence is less forthright, and perhaps silent. What 
makes it natural to think of both cases on the model of experiment is, 
first, the role of active intervention on variables (e.g. specific aspects of 
the case being considered) in order to assemble specific results and, 
second, the role played by those specific results in the development of 
more general conceptions of the subject area. By contrast, on the 
assumption that speakers and mathematicians can be more or less 
competent—that is, more or less able to track linguistic and 
mathematical fact—and that competence in both domains can be 
improved by reflective practice, the second model would not offer a 
natural way of pursuing Austin’s central aims. As in the mathematical 
case, operating in accord with the second model might provide a guide 
to patterns of competence and incompetence, and to speakers’ current 
abilities and conceptions of a subject area. Information of that sort 
might figure, peripherally, in helping to shape our views about the 
standing of particular judgments, or in the development of pedagogical 
strategy. However, its bearing on the nature of full competence, and the 
domain of facts over which that competence operates, is likely to be, at 
best, indirect. (On the potential bearing of psychology in the assessment 
of particular judgments or inferences, see e.g. Fischer 2014; Weinberg 
2015.) 
So much for Austin’s opinion. Was he entitled to it? That is a 
large, open question and I can’t hope to address it adequately here. 
(There is a large literature on this topic, the main early contributions to 
which are usefully collected in Lyas ed. 1971.) However, I shall comment 
briefly on three relevant issues. 
The first issue concerns the suggestion that Austin would have 
viewed the role of his experiments as akin to that of those undertaken in 
experimental mathematics: the assembly of pieces of knowledge, and 
thence facts, about particular cases. Minimally, the suggestion presents 
the proponent of the alternative model—which seeks instead to 
assemble information about subjects’ opinions about cases—with a 
challenge: either to defend the view that such information might play a 
fundamental role in mathematics, or to defend the differential 
treatment of mathematics and philosophy in this respect. Naturally, 
proponents of the alternative model are liable to favour the second 
disjunct. However, typical attempts to defend differential treatment of 
mathematics and philosophy point to what are, at most, differences of 
degree, rather than of kind, and, furthermore, differences the relevance 
of which is open to philosophical dispute. For example, a number of 
such attempts appeal to the comparative lack of consensus in 
philosophy. (See e.g. Chalmers 2014; Weinberg 2015.) Such attempts 
arguably both overstate the extent of consensus in mathematics (at least 
	 17 
with respect to the mathematically non-trivial) and understate the 
extent of consensus in philosophy (at least with respect to the 
philosophically trivial). (For pertinent discussion, see Clarke-Doane 
2014.) Furthermore, it would need to be shown that absence of 
consensus is relevant to deciding whether it is reasonable for 
philosophers to take themselves to be in a position to acquire 
knowledge about particular cases. Some aspects of that issue were 
discussed in §3; others lead into the second issue that I’ll consider. 
The second issue, then, concerns Austin’s plural formulation of his 
task: accounting for what we should say when. Even if we were willing to 
allow that an individual speaker can be authoritative with respect to the 
deliverances of their own competence, we might object to the idea that 
they can be authoritative with respect to the deliverances of other 
people’s competence, and so to the idea that they can be authoritative 
about what we—as opposed to they—should say when. This is a place 
where the proponent of a model of experimental ordinary language 
philosophy like Naess’s is liable to seize their chance. Taking this line, 
they would try to argue that in order to find out what others should say 
when, one would need to experiment on the others’ competences. 
One response to that line of attack points, again, to the possibility 
of variance, and development, in competence. As discussed in §2, 
Austin’s claims about what we should say when are claims about what 
those who have reflectively sharpened their competence via attention to 
particular cases would say when, and not claims about what any 
minimally competent speaker would say when. (It may be relevant here 
that the initial claim concerns what we should say, rather than what we 
would say. Subjects’ willingness reflectively to view their initial 
judgments as erroneous, as on the Wason Selection Task, might also be 
relevant here. The issue here connects with issues about the extent to 
which broadly competent thinkers and speakers can be more or less 
expert. See e.g. Gustafsson 2005; Horvath and Wiegmann 2016; 
Kauppinen 2007; Williamson 2011.) 
 But a more general response can be offered, albeit along the same 
broad line. Claims about what we would do when are ordinary plural 
claims and, so, are potentially open to both distributive and collective 
construal. On a distributive construal, a claim about what we would say 
when would immediately entail a claim of the same type about what 
each of us would say when. (Compare: on its distributive construal, a 
claim to the effect that we are philosophers entails that each of us is a 
philosopher.) By contrast, on a collective construal, a claim about what 
we would say when would fail immediately to entail a claim of the same 
type about what each of us would say when. (Compare: a claim to the 
effect that we are numerous does not entail that each of us is numerous.) 
When so construed, such claims concern the activities of a number of 
people without imposing specific demands on the activities of any 
individual amongst that number. So, if we construe claims about what 
we would say when collectively, they would carry no specific 
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commitments with respect to what each of us, so others, should say 
when. (See e.g. Oliver and Smiley 2013. For sympathetic models of the 
ways in which facts about correct applicability can depend on collective 
activities, see e.g. Burge 1979; Putnam 1975; Wiggins 1997; Williamson 
2007: 122–127.) 
The third issue is the one raised by Descartes in this paper’s 
epigraph, what Austin calls “the Last Word”: 
 
Certainly ordinary language has no claim to be the last word, if 
there is such a thing. It embodies, indeed, something better than 
the metaphysics of the Stone Age, namely, as was said, the 
inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men. But 
then, that acumen has been concentrated primarily upon the 
practical business of life. If a distinction works well for practical 
purposes in ordinary life (no mean feat, for even ordinary life is full 
of hard cases), then there is sure to be something in it, it will not 
mark nothing: yet this is likely enough to be not the best way of 
arranging things if our interests are more extensive or intellectual 
than the ordinary. And again, that experience has been derived 
only from the sources available to ordinary men throughout most 
of civilized history: it has not been fed from the resources of the 
microscope and its successors. …Certainly, then, ordinary language 
is not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented 
and improved upon and superseded. (Austin 1956–7: 185. See also 
Austin 1940: 67–69; 1956: 231–232) 
 
We’ve seen that Cook Wilson and Austin both allow that competence 
with an ordinary expression might be developed over time, and 
especially that it might be developed in light of reflection on the details 
of cases in which the expression is, or isn’t, applicable. However, they 
both restrict their attention to those details that could have figured in 
the actuation of exercises of competence, as fixed by an extant 
conception of the principle which governs those exercises. There is 
therefore a tendency in their thinking towards conservatism about the 
extent to which the development of one’s conceptions of some subject 
area can amount to the improvement of one’s competence with an old 
expression as opposed to the acquisition of a competence with a new 
expression. This tendency manifests itself in Austin’s discussion of the 
Last Word in the way in which he expects the findings of experimental 
science (“the resources of the microscope and its successors”) to figure 
in the development of philosophy. (See also Hinton 1973b.) 
Austin’s expectation is that the capture of such findings will 
require linguistic innovation, rather than being absorbed into the 
development of competence with our extant linguistic resources. 
(Austin 1962b contains an array of examples of Austin’s own 
terminological innovations, including his distinction between 
‘locutionary’, ‘illocutionary’, and ‘perlocutionary’ acts.) Now Austin is 
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surely right that that is a possible—indeed, actual—outcome of 
experimental science. However, it has been a central theme of more 
recent work that experimental science can figure more centrally in the 
development of an extant competence. That work has indicated ways in 
which the sorts of interplay between one’s initial conception of a subject 
matter and reflection on the details of that subject matter that figures in 
the development of an extant competence can be porous to information 
that didn’t figure in the initial development of the competence, or in its 
actuation. For example, it indicates that our competence with the 
expression “water” can be developed in light of experimental findings 
about the chemical structure of the stuff to which the expression has 
been applied. (See especially Putnam 1975 and, again, Wiggins 2001.) 
That work imposes a sharp limit on the extent to which naïve reflection 
on cases can fully reveal the geography of distinctions and connexions 
ensconced in our competence with ordinary language. 
 
 
5. Conclusion. 
Cook Wilson’s and Austin’s approach to philosophy aims for the 
reflective development of competence through the interplay between 
attention to language and attention to the bits of the world to which 
language is applied. Insofar as their approach is experimental, their 
views about the aims of experiment are distinctive. Most importantly, 
they view the aims of experiment as being the assembly of pieces of 
knowledge about particular cases, and so facts about those cases, rather 
than mere opinions. Although our ways of coming to have such 
knowledge are bound to be fallible, that raises no special problem. In 
particular, our fallibility doesn’t immediately force us to seek a more 
secure basis for our claims about what we should say when. 
Furthermore, I’ve suggested that the role played in their approach by 
the reflective development of competence serves to distinguish those 
approaches from others which aim only to discern the shapes of 
subjects’ extant competences. In both those ways, then, there is a 
principled distinction between their approach and common 
contemporary forms of experimental philosophy. However, I’ve also 
suggested that the same feature of their approach leads to a way in 
which our conception of the reach of ordinary language has developed 
beyond theirs, in order to take in the findings of experimental science. 
Insofar as we continue to pursue their approach, we do so with an acute 
sense of its limitations. 
Austin summarized his thinking about method in a set of notes 
entitled “Something about one way of possibly doing one part of 
philosophy.” In those notes, Austin expressed what I’ve argued to be an 
appropriate modesty, both about the reach of the methods that he 
discusses, and also about their novelty. His methods represent only a 
development of one traditional way of doing some of philosophy’s work. 
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It seems appropriate, then, to allow Austin the last word in summarizing 
our main points of agreement: 
 
Shan’t learn everything, so why not do something else? Well; not 
even whole of philosophy but firstly always has been philosophy, 
since Socrates. And some slow successes. Advantages of slowness 
and cooperation. Be your size. Small men. Foolproof ×  genius-
proof. Anyone with patience can do something. Leads to 
discoveries and agreement. Is amusing. Part of personal motive of 
my colleagues to avoid interminable bickering or boring points of 
our predecessors: also remember all brought up on classics: no 
quarrel with maths etc., just ignorant. (Austin “Something about 
one way of possibly doing one part of philosophy,” as quoted in 
Urmson 1969: 83.) 
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